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Introduction 
 
 
The Structural Weaknesses of TTIP 
Transatlantic Partnership Threatens More than Just Consumer Protection 
Heribert Dieter 
Questions concerning consumer rights have thus far dominated discussions about 
the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This is surprising, 
because very much more is at stake. Firstly, TTIP and similar large-scale projects en-
danger the future of the multilateral trading order. Secondly, before the agreement can 
be signed, enormous and as yet entirely unexplored obstacles will need to be overcome; 
this includes the question of inter-state dispute settlement. The economic benefits of 
TTIP will also be smaller than claimed, whereas the long-term political damage, espe-
cially for Germany, could be considerable. 
 
Listening to the German debate over the 
planned trade partnership, one could be 
forgiven for concluding that protecting 
German consumers from the machinations 
of the US farming lobby was the most im-
portant issue in international economic 
relations. This one-sidedness in the discus-
sion is dangerous, as TTIP in fact raises a 
whole series of discrepancies and problems, 
including fragmentation of the established 
trading order and American inconsistency 
in abandoning the international consensus 
on financial policy for new unilateral 
banking regulations. This contradiction has 
largely gone under the radar: while the 
United States and European Union nego-
tiate harmonisation of product standards, 
new, diverging rules are created in finan-
cial market regulation. 
Why No Progress in the Doha Round? 
Before examining the weaknesses of TTIP, 
however, we must first consider why the 
WTO’s Doha Round has failed to produce 
results. The proponents of a transatlantic 
partnership insist that the sluggishness of 
the Doha Round leaves no alternative to 
TTIP. Of course multilateral liberalisation 
is the ideal, they say, but it is impossible if 
the Doha partners are unable to reach a 
consensus. 
But which countries are actually block-
ing progress? The World Trade Organiza-
tion will name no names, but it is plainly a 
handful of states. Rather than the small 
developing countries, it is the United States 
and a number of emerging economies that 
stand in the way of a positive outcome. 
Washington’s negative stance is driven 
above all by domestic political considera-
tions. In the United States there is no 
 Professor Heribert Dieter is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Global Issues Division SWP Comments 32 
 and Visiting Professor for International Political Economy at Zeppelin University (Friedrichshafen). July 2014 
1 
 longer broad support for further deepening 
of the international division of labour, and 
many US citizens have become very critical 
of globalisation. With opinion polls reveal-
ing great reservations about trade liberali-
sation, President Barack Obama has shied 
away from tackling the issue head-on. By 
advocating TTIP as a move to ensure “free 
and fair trade”, rather than a trade liberali-
sation project, he taps into widespread 
domestic concerns about “unfair” compe-
tition. In the 1980s many Americans re-
garded Japan as “unfair”, today China is 
usually the target. 
This is where the first contradiction of 
TTIP appears. Why should the European 
Union, whose rhetoric commits it to an 
open, multilateral trading order, conclude 
such an agreement with the state that is 
blocking progress in the WTO? 
Washington is, however, not solely 
responsible for backing the WTO into a 
corner. With hindsight, then Director-
General Mike Moore’s decision in 2001 to 
label the Doha Round the “Doha Develop-
ment Agenda” without consulting the 
trade ministers turned out to be extremely 
unfortunate. Moore created two fatal ex-
pectations: The developing and emerging 
economies now believed that this was 
“their” round, where they could expect  
far-reaching concessions from the OECD 
countries. Traditional supporters of trade 
liberalisation such as industry bodies in 
OECD states, on the other hand, were given 
the impression that the Doha Round was 
not serving their interests. They turned 
their backs on the WTO talks and concen-
trated instead on creating bilateral free 
trade areas. 
In the meantime about 380 such prefer-
ential agreements have been signed and 
another 200, including TTIP, are in the 
pipeline. Although the WTO’s Ministerial 
Conference in Bali at the end of 2013 was 
able to agree a series of measures intended 
to ease trade, the organisation is still far 
removed from its past strength. 
Overstated Economic Benefits 
As with other trade proposals, TTIP’s 
advocates raise expectations that will be 
impossible to fulfil. This applies both to the 
expected effects on economic growth and 
to the predicted creation of new jobs. The 
central reason for this is that the negative 
repercussions of preferential agreements 
are not adequately taken into account. 
The most important factor here is the 
role of certificates of origin. In return for 
the waiving of tariffs, companies must 
document the origin of their goods, which 
entails significant administrative costs. 
Especially for smaller and medium-size 
companies, the rules of origin generate 
burdensome administrative obstacles. 
Astonishingly, this aspect plays virtually 
no role in the debates about TTIP, nor 
does it feature meaningfully in scholarly 
research. For example, a study prepared 
by the London-based Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (CEPR) on behalf of the 
European Commission does not even men-
tion this question. The study includes no 
calculation of negative impacts. This is 
more than a mere oversight. The propo-
nents of TTIP expect great economic ben-
efits: CEPR calculates that it would increase 
the annual disposable income of the aver-
age European family by €545, and EU Trade 
Commissioner Karel de Gucht has repeat-
edly cited this figure in support of TTIP. In 
fact the economic gains are likely to be 
very much more modest than the elaborate 
forecasts of many researchers would sug-
gest. The main reason for this is that the 
costs arising through documentation of 
origin remain unaccounted for. In other 
words, the savings arising through the 
abolition of tariffs have been calculated, 
but not the associated costs to businesses. 
That is plainly a grave weakness of the 
mathematical models. TTIP will therefore 
create very many fewer jobs than the pub-
lished studies suggest, and the boost to 
economic growth will be considerably 
smaller. 
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 Anti-Competitive Rules of Origin 
The aforementioned problems stem partly 
from the very technical and complex 
nature of the issues involved. While 
preferential trade agreements facilitate 
commerce between participating econo-
mies, they certainly do not liberalise the 
entire foreign trade of the participating 
countries. If that were the objective, uni-
lateral liberalisation would suffice. What 
countries concluding a preferential trade 
agreement want, on the other hand, is to 
prevent their external trade policy being 
undermined. That means restricting pref-
erences to goods manufactured within the 
free trade area itself. Rules of origin serve 
to define the “nationality” of a product. At 
the same time, rules of origin can simply 
be bypassed through payment of the corre-
sponding customs duty, dispensing with 
preferential treatment to avoid their trade-
restrictive effect. 
Where tariffs lie in the single-digit range, 
it may be easier or even cheaper for busi-
nesses to simply pay the duty rather than 
documenting origin. Considering that the 
cost of preparing certification of origin is 
estimated at about 5 percent of the value 
of the goods, while the average tariff on 
industrial goods in transatlantic trade is 
only about 3.5 percent, the possible eco-
nomic benefits of TTIP are plainly relative. 
Exclusion of China and Other 
Countries 
Overestimated economic benefits are not 
the only question mark hanging over TTIP. 
The exclusion of China and other emerging 
economies from trade regulation processes 
is also an earnest problem. In this connec-
tion it is often argued that Washington and 
Brussels must make use of this last chance 
to lay down rules, before Beijing dictates 
the future rules governing international 
economic relations. The implied assump-
tion that China is still willing to accept 
rules from whose formulation it has been 
excluded is quite unconvincing and ignores 
Beijing’s growing weight and confidence. 
The new mega-regional trade projects 
pushed by the European Union and the 
United States not only weaken the WTO, 
but also betray their own principles. The 
multilateral trading order shaped after 
1945 by the United States, later joined by 
Europe, aimed primarily at overcoming the 
trade discrimination of the inter-war years. 
The heart of the 1947 General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the most fa-
voured nation principle (Article 1), was 
a masterstroke not only from an economic 
perspective, but also in terms of stabilising 
international relations. At least for the 
countries participating in the agreement, 
this overcame the distinction between 
friend and foe that had crippled foreign 
trade during the 1930s. 
In view of these historical experiences 
there is no comprehensible reason to ditch 
the multilateral trading order. The Euro-
pean Union and the United States cannot 
prevent China’s continuing rise – but they 
can ensure that international trade is con-
ducted within a system of rules that they 
themselves have shaped. 
The Dispute Settlement Problem  
Yet another problem of the TTIP is dispute 
settlement between individual states. The 
WTO’s dispute mechanisms are almost 
unanimously regarded as valuable and 
successful. They permit countries, however 
small or large, to have the trade policies 
of other states scrutinised. The European 
Union and the United States have fre-
quently pursued complaints in this frame-
work, for example in the dispute over 
Boeing and Airbus. But how should future 
disputes be settled? Should TTIP have its 
own court of settlement? And why should 
Europeans and Americans now be able to 
agree on conflicts that they were unable to 
resolve in the past even with the help of 
dispute settlement mechanisms? It would 
appear naive to expect expedited dispute 
settlement between the United States and 
the European Union without the help of 
the WTO. 
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 Contradictory American Moves 
The latest US initiatives to regulate the 
financial markets also raise questions. 
While US Trade Representative Michael 
Froman never tires of preaching the ben-
efits of harmonising standards for trade in 
goods, US financial regulators are moving 
in the opposite direction. In 2014 Wash-
ington abandoned the principle of home-
country regulation in finance, under which 
for example Deutsche Bank was regulated 
in Frankfurt, and only in Frankfurt. Bank-
ing supervisors in the United States did not 
evaluate the adequacy of risk assessment 
models used by Deutsche Bank and other 
foreign banks, nor did they request foreign 
banks to hold core capital in the United 
States. In future, however, foreign banks 
operating in the United States will also 
be regulated by the US authorities (host-
country regulation) and will have to hold 
capital there, too. While there is certainly 
room to debate the pros and cons of such 
a “Balkanization of finance” (The Economist), 
the trend certainly jars with the spirit of 
a single transatlantic economic space. 
Deutsche Bank and the French BNP 
Paribas are currently facing huge US de-
mands. BNP has been fined $8.9 billion for 
violating US sanctions against Iran and 
other countries. Paris has sharply criticised 
this measure and sees France’s sovereignty 
threatened. And indeed, BNP is not re-
ported to have violated any French laws. 
Small Benefit, Great Harm 
There are thus many reasons to question 
TTIP. Preferential trade agreements, which 
make international trade more complex 
and less transparent, do most harm to 
medium-sized companies, also in Germany. 
TTIP and other “mega-regionals” are espe-
cially problematic, as they possess little in 
the way of economic justification. These 
new initiatives serve geopolitical as well as 
economic objectives. 
Politicians are increasingly turning away 
from the economic ideal of multilateral 
regulation and trade liberalisation. Instead, 
discrimination creeping back into trade 
policy could generate growing conflicts in 
the new multipolar world order. Here 
geopolitics is undermining a liberal con-
sensus in trade policy that has lasted since 
the end of the Second World War. 
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